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This Technical Report is a revision and extension to a report
previously conducted by Willis R. Greer: A Method for Estimating
and Controlling the Cost of Extending Technology (Naval
Postgraduate School Technical Report, NPS-54-88-002 , Monterey,
CA, March 1988) . Dr. Greer's task was to develop a method for
measuring extensions in the state of the art of technology in
complex high technology systems and document relationships
between technology extensions and cost. His report consisted of
the following steps:
1. Review of literature on costing technology extensions.
2. a. Collection of data for 18 satellite systems measuring 17
distinct technology related characteristics for each
system.
b. Statistical "reduction" of the 17 measures of technology
characteristics into four basic dimensions of technology.
Factor analysis was used and four factors scores,
representing the four technology dimensions, resulted.
3. Creation of measures of technological extension of new
systems vis-a-vis predecessor systems. An "ellipsoid"
approach relying on the euclidean distance between factor
scores in 4-dimensional space was used.
4. Description of relationships between the development cost of
systems and the technological extension required in creating
the system.
5. Creation of measures of variances reflecting the difference
between expected development cost, given the technological
extension required, and actual development cost.
Further analysis indicates that the procedures used in
creating measures of technological extension (step 3) were
inconsistent with the way the basic dimensions of technology were






used in step 3 requires as its input dimensions that have a
"natural zero" point, where zero implies zero technological
sophistication or complexity. The factor scores created in step
2b do not possess this property.
It should be noted that Dr. Greer's ellipsoid analysis
creates and describes a novel approach to measuring technology
extension, one that is potentially very useful in situations
where the data fulfills the necessary constraints for its use.
However, applying his approach when the input data are factor
scores requires an arbitrary transformation of the factor scores
which can only be justified on ad hoc basis.
This technical report first undertakes an analysis analogous
to Dr. Greer's but uses an alternative approach to measuring
technology extensions (step 3) . The analysis continues to
address the question of relationships between technology and
development cost (step 4) and creates measures of development
cost variances (step 5)
.
Additionally, this technical report extends the analysis to
examine the production cost of systems. Relationships between
measures of technology extension and development cost with
subsequent production cost are documented. And models for
estimating production cost are presented.
This technical report is self-contained, in that it can be
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ESTIMATING AND CONTROLLING
THE COST OF EXTENDING TECHNOLOGY
ABSTRACT
When firms undertake new development projects, there is
considerable uncertainty as to the amount of cost that will
eventually be incurred. This study tests hypotheses concerning
the relationships between extensions in technology and costs, and
provides approaches for estimating and controlling costs. The
study begins by examining the techniques currently available for
measuring the state-of-the-art of technology. Next, methods for
quantifying the incremental progress represented by a particular
project are reviewed and extended. Third, relationships between
technology measures and development time and development costs
are formulated and tested. Fourth, variance measures related to
development cost are specified. Fifth, relationships between the
scope of the development phase of a program and subsequent
production costs are examined. Finally, the idea of a
development cost "premium," used to relate development costs to
production costs, is introduced and tested. The workability of
the approach for cost prediction and control is tested and




THE COST OF EXTENDING TECHNOLOGY
When firms engage in research and development activities they
encounter exceptionally difficult cost control problems. In
fact, when such endeavors are undertaken on behalf of an external
sponsor, a Department of Defense activity for example, the
uncertainty involved generally requires using some variant of
cost-plus pricing. If the task is performed speculatively, or on
a fixed price basis, there is serious cost risk.
Part of the problem stems from an absence of clear measures
of technology—how "advanced" is a particular aircraft or
computer? Or how much more advanced is the objective of this
particular development project? Additionally, there is no
reliable methodology for associating development costs with
different degrees of technological advance.
This study examines and extends techniques currently
available for measuring the state-of-the-art (SOA) of technology
and technology extensions by drawing on several suggestions from
the literature. Relationships of SOA and SOA extension with
development time and development cost are then specified and
tested. The approach produces measures of variances that may be
used in the process of controlling development cost.
Relationships between development cost and production cost are
also examined by introducing and testing a concept called the
development cost "premium." The methodology developed is
demonstrated and empirically tested with data from 18 satellite
programs. The end result is the establishment of a series of
relationships between technology and costs that can be used to
estimate and control the cost of extending technology. We begin
by reviewing approaches in the literature to measuring the
technology embodied in a system.
MEASURING THE STATE OF THE ART OF TECHNOLOGY
The literature on technology measurement offers three broad
approaches to determining the state-of-the-art (SOA) of
technology for a given set of related systems. Each approach
requires the knowledge of a number (n) of technology variables
reflecting distinct properties or characteristics. Each combines
the variables into a single SOA measure. For background, we
review each approach, discussing advantages and disadvantages,
and conclude that one approach is most applicable to our data.
Judgmental Weighting . This approach, discussed by Gordon and
Munson [1981], expresses SOA as a direct combination of values of
the technology characteristics. Gordon and Munson suggest two
general forms of SOA equations.
SOA = K^! + K2V2 + . . . + KnVn (1)
and
where
SOA = V! [K2V2 + K3V3 + . . . KnVn ] (2)
K-l = judgmentally assigned weights
Vi = the value of the ith technology-describing
variable.
The first version of the model is a simple linear combination of
weighted characteristics, the second version is a multiplicative
form intended for use when one variable (V^) must be present in
the system. Gordon and Munson provide applications of the first
version to measure the SOA for computer systems and the second
version to measure the SOA for antibiotic drugs. Similar
approached have been used by the Department of Defense to measure
aircraft performance [Timperlake, et al., 1980].
While useful in some situations the approach has drawbacks.
It is inherently subjective when the weights are assigned
judgmentally, requiring a panel of experts. It also presupposes
sufficient theoretical understanding of how individual
characteristics "combine" to produce SOA in order to specify ex
ante an appropriate form of the model. In addition, setting
weights becomes quite difficult when n is large. Gordon and
Munson suggest that factor analysis may be useful to reduce the
number of technology descriptors, but the difficulty of ascribing
intuitive meaning to factors increases the judgmental problem of
assigning weights when factors are used as the technology
descriptors.
Ellipsoid fitting . In 1985, Dodson [1985] reported an
important advance in technology measurement which was based on
work he did much earlier with Graver [1969]. The approach was to
make use of convex (ellipsoidal) hypersurfaces to represent
particular levels of technology. In order to utilize the
approach, n technology attributes are specified and measured
across a sample of the systems under study. An n-dimensional
ellipsoid is then fit to the design attribute measurements. The
curve follows the general form of an ellipse,
x? xl xl
_+_+*•* +_=1 (3)
2 2 212 n
where
X^ = technology-describing variables
a-j^ = weights assigned by the ellipsoid fitting procedure.
The fitting technique uses a least squares algorithm, and
operates on proportional distances of points from the origin.
-
1-
Once fit to a sample of systems, taken from a common time
period, the ellipsoid surface can be viewed as reflecting the SOA
of technology for that time period. The SOA of an individual
system can be determined by plugging the values of the n
technology-describing variables for the individual system into
the ellipsoid equation to arrive at a measure of the radial
distance from the origin for the system.
The method can best be illustrated in two dimensions, using
data on aircraft systems from Martino [1985]. 2 Figure 1 plots
indices representing the speed and useful load of eight existing
aircraft, and for one new aircraft (to be developed) . Had the
objective of the new aircraft development program been a point
^Programs for fitting ellipsoids are available in Fortran
and Basic in Dodson and Graver [1969] and Greer [1988],
respectively.
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near the existing technology surface (represented by the ellip-
soid) only redesign effort would have been required—no advance
in prevailing technology would be necessary. (Speed and useful
load are attributes that designers can trade off against one
another, subject to diminishing returns) . But the new aircraft
is required to be more advanced in both respects, so technology
must be advanced beyond its current level.
One advantage of the ellipsoid approach lies in the fact that
the resulting measure of technology, the proportional, radial
distance from the origin, is scale-free. A second advantage lies
in the theoretical appropriateness of the ellipsoid surface. It
is consistent with the constraints designers face in trading off
design attributes against each other to achieve an overall
objective (e.g., speed versus load). 3 The disadvantages are that
reasonable stability in the ellipsoid can be achieved only when
the number of variables is small in relation to the sample size, 4
and that the n measures used to describe technology character-
istics have to take on only positive values and have a natural
zero point so that the distance from the origin is meaningful. 5
Thus, for example, factor scores resulting from variable
3For elaboration of this last point see Knight's [1985]
discussion and test of Grosch's law as it relates to design
tradeoffs.
4The authors have found from experience that at least four
observations per variable are needed.
5More formally, the measures need to be of ratio scale,
rather than merely interval, ordinal or nominal scale. See
Kerlinger [1973, Chapter 25]. Dodson [1970] discussed other
constraints on appropriate measures to be used in the ellipsoid approach.
reduction techniques such as factor analysis can not be
appropriately used to fit an ellipsoid.
"Year-of-Technology" Regression . A third approach frequently
used [e.q. Alexander and Nelson, 1972; Dodson, 1977] employs
multiple regression to combine several technology-describing
variables across a sample of systems. The "year of technology"
is the dependent variable, where this is usually interpreted as
the year in which the system became operational
.
Y = a + bjXi + b2X2 + . . . + bnXn + e (4)
where Y = actual year the system became operational.
b^ = regression coefficients
X^ = technology-describing measures
e = residual
Predicted values (Ye ) from the regression equation for an
individual system represents the "year-of-technology" or SOA for
the system, i.e.,
SOAj = Ye j = a + b^X^ + . . . bnXnj (5)
As simplistic as this method seems, related work by Lienhard
[1979] tends to support the concept. His paper studied the rate
at which technology is improved, and how (whether) this rate
changes through time. He studied several forms of technology
(clocks, steam power, land transportation, low temperatures, air
transportation) over extended time periods. The most relevant
observations to come from Lienhard 's study was that the rate of
improvement of a particular technology, once established, does
not change. If this is literally correct (and his data do seem
6
to support the observation) , there could be some major
implications for the cost, and even the feasibility, of
attempting to effect technological advances "before their time 11 .
If a desired advance could normally be expected to occur only by
some quasi-naturally established date, attempts to accelerate
this process would be very costly. Accordingly, the "year of
technology" approach may be well reasoned.
MEASURING EXTENSIONS IN TECHNOLOGY
To address the issue of advances in technology, measures of
increments in technology are necessary. In general, the
procedure for measuring increments in technology is similar
across the three approaches: A reference point, reflecting the
current state of technology, is established and the distance
between the reference point and the technology in a particular
system is measured. Out data (to be discussed in a following
section) describes technology characteristics using factor
scores. Consequently we rejected the judgmental weighting
approach (attaching weights to factors is conceptually difficult)
and the ellipsoid approach (factor scores violate the ellipsoid
assumptions) and relied on the year-of-technology approach. 6
The essence of the year-of-technology approach is to combine
numerous technology descriptions into a summary technology
measure, expressed in terms of time (years) . Using this notion,
6Greer [1988] discusses procedures for creating measures of
technology extension from the ellipsoid approach.
we create three technology measures for each individual system:
REACH, ADVANCE and STAND.
Recall that the predicted value (Ye ) from the regression
(Equation 5) represent the year-of-technology for a given system.
Ye is a summary measure of the degree of technology embodied in
the system. We define Ye as the technological REACH of the
system.
Alexander and Nelson [1972] and Dodson [1977] argue that if
the actual year (Y) a system was produced was less than the
predicted year (Y < Ye ) then that system was "ahead of it's
time": the "state-of-the-art" was advanced when that model was
developed. (Conversely, if Y > Ye then the system was "behind
the times.") Therefore, Ye-Y measures the extent to which each
system represented a technological advance. In short, we define
ADVANCE as Ye-Y
Finally, since the state of the art of technology at any
moment is defined in terms of years, the year in which a system
becomes operational represents where technology in general
currently "stands." Hence STAND simply equals Y.
Our interest in these three technology measures is in using
them to assist in cost prediction and control. This will be
illustrated with a sample of satellite systems.
SAMPLE AND DATA
Our sample consisted of 18 satellite programs; with the
initial satellite of each program first launched between 1966 and
8
1986. The sample included several types of satellites - communi-
cations, surveillance, navigation, etc. Data were obtained from
the U. S. Air Force. 7
All the methods of measuring the state-of-the-art of
technology and technology extensions require basic data
describing properties or characteristics of the systems under
study. Data describing 84 technical characteristics of each of
the 18 satellites were available.
Variable Selection
In selecting variables to be used in measuring the technology
embedded in the category of systems to be studied, technical
expertise must be sought. In selecting variables, the experts
should bear in mind that the technology-describing
characteristics must be at least partially alterable by
engineering development decisions. They should choose
characteristics which are goals of the design process. Ideally
the variables should be specified so that increasing values
correspond to greater technical difficulty. Finally, the values
of the variables should be ascertainable during the early stages
of the system's life-cycle so they may be used in the process of
predicting costs.
7These data were supplied by Headquarters, Space Division
(AFSC) , Los Angeles Air Force Station, Los Angeles, CA. While
the data are not classified, the authors were asked not to
identify specific satellites by name or designator. To honor
this request the systems will be referred to only by randomly-
assigned code letters. The authors are particularly indebted to
Captain Blain Webber, USAF, for his assistance and cooperation.
Some of the 84 properties included in the data set could be
considered design objectives, and therefore appropriate as
technology indicators, but many others were simply byproducts of
the design. Others were potentially useful, but were not stated
in a form that revealed much about the technology embodied.
Our first step was to identify which of the 84
characteristics were relevant to describing the state of
technology in the satellite systems. Technical expertise was
sought and extensive data review, conversations and conferences
took place among a small group of satellite experts. 8 The result
of these conferences was consensus identification of 17 variables
that are well-suited to describing satellite technology. The 17
variables are listed in Appendix I.
Second, with 17 variables to describe 18 systems, variable
reduction was necessary. Principle components factor analysis
with varimax orthogonal rotation was conducted. 9 The result was
a final factor matrix explaining 81.7% of the variance in the
technology variables. Four separate factors had eigenvalues
greater than one. They were retained for use in the remainder of
the analysis. The four factors reflect four different aspects of
satellite technology which we labeled as follows:
8The authors are indebted to the Naval Postgraduate School,
and particularly to Dr. Allen E. Fuhs, Distinguished Professor of
Aeronautics & Space, Dr. Richard W. Adler, Adjunct Professor,
Elec. & Comp. Engineering, and Mr. Marty Mosier, Staff Engineer,
Space Systems, for their invaluable assistance.
9For a comprehensive discussion of factor analysis see
Harman [1976] .
10
Factor 1: Mission requirements
Factor 2 : Orbital
Factor 3 : Electrical Power
Factor 4 : Environment
A detailed description of the factor analysis is contained in
Appendix II. Factor scores for each of the 18 satellites are
contained in Table 1.
CREATING TECHNOLOGY MEASURES
Following the year-of-technology approach, the launch year
(of the first unit) of each satellite program was regressed
against the MISSION, ORBITAL, ELECTRICAL and ENVIRONMENT factor
scores. Results are in Table 2. Note that the overall model is
significant and explains a large portion of the variance
(adjusted R2 = .65). In addition, each factor is reasonably
significant 10 with positive coefficients, consistent with
increasing values of the four technology descriptors reflecting
increasing technology over time. This provides some confirmation
that the factor scores appropriately reflect dimensions of
technology and technology growth.
Figure 2 shows a plot of year-of-launch (Y) versus year-of-
technology (Ye ) . Using the approach outlined earlier, we can
determine values for STAND, REACH and ADVANCE for each system.
By way of illustration we might view system H, highlighted in the
Figure. It was actually launched in 1969 (STAND) but has a year-






System Fact 1 Fact 2 Fact 3 Fact 4
A 0.5481 1.4894 1.4514 1.3038
B -0.7021 -0.6149 0.8253 -0.8771
C 1.4523 -1.1906 0.3233 2.3646
D -0.2591 1.1941 0.8042 0.0857
E -0.8919 -0.7342 0.4668 -0.6761
F -0.5195 0.6648 -1.3337 0.8363
G -0.2870 -1.3133 -1.7576 0.8937
H 0.4619 -0.8923 -0.4650 -1.1932
r 2.1776 -1.0966 0.4696 -0.3093
j -1.4171 -1.0918 1.5999 -0.0233
K -1.0725 0.9872 0.2058 0.4739
L -0.9641 -0.6474 0.0670 -0.2184
M -0.1629 -0.8299 0.2157 -0.4064
N -1.1595 0.7442 -1.0434 1.0676
0.6814 0.9718 -0.4915 -1.6992
P 0.1755 0.7231 -0.4819 -0.8667
Q 0.7529 0.4861 -1.7235 -0.4232










MISSION 2.213 2.84 .007
ORBITAL 1.103 1.41 .090
ELECTRICAL 3.698 4.74 .001
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of-technology value (REACH) that falls between 1972 and 1973.
Thus it was three to four years ahead (ADVANCE) of the general
trend in technology. More precise measures for system H and the
other systems are in Table 3
.
DEVELOPMENT COSTS - HYPOTHESIS AND TESTS
Our next objective was to explain development costs using the
technology measures. Data relevant to this (and later) portions
of the analysis are in Table 4 . The reported development cost
figures are "nonrecurring" costs provided by the Air Force for
each system, adjusted to constant 1986 dollars (thousands) . The
development time figures report the time elapsed in months from
the awarding of the development contract to the first launch of
the satellite. The reported production cost figures are
"recurring" costs per unit, i.e., costs incurred in manufacturing
each unit of a given satellite program after the development
phase, also adjusted to 1986 dollars. The production run figures
are the number of units produced for each separate satellite
program.
System A was excluded from Table 4 because it was known to
have been a very minor upgrade of another satellite for which
data were not available. Data on development time for systems D
and F were unavailable because the contract dates were unknown.
D and F were excluded from analyses requiring development time
and production costs. The data were complete for the remaining
15 systems, except that only the year of the contract award, not









B 76 -.64 75.36
C 82 .01 82.01
D 78 1.55 79.55
E 77 -3.25 73.75
F 66 5.50 71.50
G 66 2.34 68.34
H 69 3.43 72.43
I 83 -2.35 80.65
J 75 2.26 77.26
K 79 -3.16 75.84
L 73 -.17 72.83
M 76 -1.30 74.70
N 74 -2.44 71.56
71 3.19 74.19
P 76 -2.05 73.95
Q 76 -5.02 70.98
R 80 2.40 82.40
12a
TABLE 4
DEVELOPMENT AND PRODUCTION DATA
DEVELOPMENT DEVELOPMENT PRODUCTION PRODUCTION
SYSTEM COST TIME (months) COST RUN
A
B 91707 37 23483 4
C 157820 64 46865 2
D 50393 - - 3
E 108085 37 54094 3
F 509262 - - 5
G 279270 20 49847 23
H 73594 25 50414 1
I 451274 86 51972 6
J 155524 46 118752 1
K 14943 36 17697 1
L 37228 32 7715 3
M 319499 37 387034 1
N 32585 28 11266 3
116580 27 35666 4
P 121931 33 56574 3
Q 64384 37 28048 3
R 180653 56 39432 15
12b
assumption adopted was to date the contract award at mid-year,
but other assumptions were analyzed for result sensitivity with
very little disparity.
Development Cost and Technological Complexity
Our first hypothesis was that there is a direct relationship
between development cost and the scope of the development task at
hand, measured in terms of technological complexity. Two
variables capture complexity: STAND measures the current state
of technology at the time of project development. As the state
of technology increases, designers are operating at a greater
level of complexity and consequently costs of extending
technology are hypothesized to increase. ADVANCE measures the
increment in technology to be achieved by the development
project; costs are also hypothesized to increase with magnitude
of the advance required. (REACH is simply the sum of STAND and
ADVANCE; consequently it contains no additional information and
is excluded from the analysis)
.
H 1 : Development Cost = f (+ STAND, + ADVANCE)
To test the first hypothesis, a multiple regression was run.
Results are in Table 5. Coefficients for both STAND and ADVANCE
are positive as expected, but neither is significant at
traditional levels. The model as a whole is unimpressive: The
R2 is low (.12) and the overall model insignificant.
The low explanatory ability of the model is not totally
unexpected. Dodson [1977] also attempted to predict development




REGRESSION OF DEVELOPMENT COST ON TECHNOLOGY MEASURES
Dependent Variable: Development Cost
Independent
Variables Coefficients t Significance *
Intercept 30937
STAND 1749 .19 .425





Adjusted R2 : -.01
*One Tailed Tests
13a
little success. He concluded that his poor result was due to
incomplete modeling.
Development Time and Technological Complexity
We hypothesize that there is an intervening variable between
development cost and technological complexity: development time.
Complexity affects time; time effects cost. Our second
hypothesis then is that the difficulty of the development task,
as measured by the time required for its completion, is a
positive function of technological complexity.
H2 : Development Time = f (+ STAND, + ADVANCE)
Table 6 shows results of regressing development time on the
technology variables. Results are considerably more impressive.
The model is highly significant with an adjusted R2 of .75. Both
STAND and ADVANCE have significant positive coefficients as
expected. The actual time required to complete a development
project is a function of both the level of technological
complexity at which the task is taking place and the increment in
technology to be achieved.
Development Cost and Development Time
Development cost should be related to development time, but
development cost may not be a smooth function of time. If a
program drags on beyond its intended completion date, additional
resources may be employed to accelerate its completion. Hence,
it may be relatively more costly to compress the required




Dependent Variable: Development Time (months)
Independent
Variables Coefficients t Significance *
Intercept -239
STAND 3.70 6.55 .001









took the predicted times from the above model as a "natural"
development time, and the residuals as departures (which may or
may not have been planned ex ante) from this natural time. We
expect both time measures to be positively associated with cost,
suggesting the following hypothesis:
H3 : Development Cost = f (+ Predicted Time, + Residual Time)
where Residual Time = Actual Time - Predicted Time.
The results of the multiple regression (Table 7) are good,
although not as strong as the previous test. Both time variables
have reasonably significant positive coefficients as
hypothesized, and as expected the coefficient for the residual
time term is larger than that for predicted time. This is
consistent with extension of a project beyond its natural
development time leading to increased time pressure, increased
resources expended to accelerate completion and increased costs.
Additionally note that the explanatory ability of this model
(adjusted R2 ) has improved markedly relative to the first model
which explained cost directly by the technology variables,
indicating that development time is indeed an intervening
variable in the determination of costs.
INTERPRETATION OF RESULTS FOR CONTROL
The most basic principle of cost control is to attribute
differences between anticipated costs and actual costs to causes.
That is, to explain variances. The preceding analysis affords an





Dependent Variable: Development Cost
Independent
Variables Coefficients t Significance *
Intercept 52841
Predicted Time 2350 1.55 .074





Adjusted R2 : .49
*0ne Tailed Tests
15a
Table 8. The column labeled "Ex Ante Cost Estimate" was
constructed in the following way:
1. The particular system's values for STAND and ADVANCE
(both determinable ex ante) were entered in the "Time" regression
to predict a time that would be required for the system's
development.
2. To calculate the ex ante prediction of development cost,
the Predicted Time was input to the "Cost" regression, with
Residual set equal to zero (thereby assuming the predicted time
would be achieved)
.
Next the actual time for the project was compared with
the predicted time to determine the Residual ( ex post ) . The Cost
regression was then revisited with values for both variables, and
a new cost estimate constructed, considering the actual time for
the project. This produced the column titled "Cost Est Based on
Act Time"
.
The difference between the ex ante cost estimate and the
cost estimate based on the project's actual time has been termed
the "Variance Due to Time". This figure is a best estimate of
the portion of the total variance that can be attributed to the
cost consequences of time delays (or to fortuitus and perhaps
unforeseen acceleration of the schedule) . Negative figures are
favorable, positive are unfavorable.
When Actual Cost is compared with the cost estimate based on
actual time the result is a "Cost Control Variance". Given that
the project actually took t months to complete, the cost should
16
TABLE 8
DEVELOPMENT COST VARIANCE DATA
EX ANTE VARIANCE COST EST. COST ACTUAL TOTAL











C 205478 -9927 195551 -37731 157820 -47658
E 146449 -29664 116784 -8699 108085 -38364
G 77307 100530 177837 101433 279270 201964
H 108593 13394 121987 -48393 73594 -34999
I 202957 231936 434894 16380 451274 248317
J 155288 25253 180541 -25017 155524 236
K 164271 -119643 44628 -29685 14943 -149328
L 126265 7948 134214 -96985 37228 -89037
M 147029 -32254 114775 204724 319499 172469
N 124175 -24658 99517 -66931 32585 -91590
124871 -38247 86624 29956 116580 -8291
P 143478 -58343 85134 36797 121931 -21546
Q 129307 46796 176103 -111718 64384 -64922
R 199461 -66948 132513 48140 180653 -18808
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have been "Cost Est Based on Act Time". The actual cost was a
different amount, so the variation is attributed to the
contractor's success (or lack thereof) in cost control. Again,
negative figures are favorable.
The variances have been shown graphically in Figure 3. The
variances are expressed as a percentage of Ex Ante Cost. 11
As Figure 3 indicates, there were non-trivial unfavorable
total variances for three of the 15 programs (G, I, M) . For
program I the cause of the unfavorable variance appears to have
been mostly attributable to a timing problem. For Program M the
origin of the problem was cost control. Both cost control and
timing problems appear to have been significant contributors to
the total variance for program G; its total variance is by far
the largest. (If these variances seem large compared with what
the reader is accustomed to, consider the fact that there is far
greater uncertainty surrounding a research project's costs than
those of a routine manufacturing operation.)
Program J is interesting in that an unfavorable cost control
variance is offset by successful control over time, leaving the
total cost variance insignificantly small.
11The variances could also have been expressed as a
percentage of Est. Cost Based on Actual Time or Actual Cost. Use
of either of these alternatives would of course change the
individual percentages, but not the sign of the variance nor the
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The most significant favorable variances are for programs K,
L and N. Successful cost control is the primary source of the
favorable variance for L and N. Program K has the largest
favorable variance and while both cost control and time control
contribute, control over time is the primary explanation.
ANALYSIS OF PRODUCTION COST
With completion of the development phase, three kinds of
information, reflecting technological complexity, development
stage costs and cost variances, are available. Our next question
was whether our measures resulting from the analysis of the
development phase are useful in explaining production costs.
In the following sections we develop and test four
hypotheses concerning the relationship of production cost with
the "scale" of the development program, cost control during the
development phase, the technological complexity of the system,
and the production run.
Production Cost and the Scale of the Development Phase
To summarize the previous analysis: We first used measures
of the technological complexity of the program (ADVANCE, STAND)
to predict development time. We calculated Ex Ante Development
Cost directly from predicted development time. (One is a linear
transformation of the other; hence they both capture the same
variance and are equivalent when used in linear models such as
regression.) Ex Ante Development Cost is our best summary
measure of the scale of the development program known prior to
18
its start. We then analyzed the differences between Ex Ante and
Actual Development Cost into variances. The Ex Ante Cost plus
the variances equal the Actual Cost, which is our best summary
measure of the scale of the development program known after its
completion.
Our initial hypothesis is that production costs are
positively related to the scale of the development program;
simply put, systems that are costly to develop are costly to
produce
.
H4 : Production Cost = f (+ scale of the development
project)
If the variances due to time or cost control are isolated to the
development phase of a program and have no implications for
production cost, then Ex Ante Development Cost should provide the
best measure of the scale of the program to use in explaining
production cost. Alternatively, if variances during the
development phase indicate conditions that can be expected to
recur during the production phase of the program, then the ex
post Actual Development Cost should be a better measure of scale
to explain production cost. Our intuition tells us that cost
overruns during development are associated with higher cost
during production.
It is necessary to control for another factor potentially
affecting cost. The production cost measures are average unit
costs determined by dividing the total production cost for a
satellite program by the number of units produced (cost per
specific individual unit were not available) . It is well
19
established that unit production cost typically decreases as the
number of units produced increases, due to the learning curve
effect. We control for this effect by explicitly testing the
following:
H5 : Production Cost = f (- Production Run)
where the Production Run is the number of units produced for each
satellite program.
Table 9 (Models 1 and 2) shows separate regressions of
Production Cost on the two alternative development cost measures:
Ex Ante and Actual Development Costs, respectively. Production
Run is included in each model as a control and as a test of
Hypothesis 5. The natural log of each of the variables is used
in the regressions, for two reasons.
First, learning curve theory states that the decrease in
production cost with increases in production quantity is log
linear rather than linear. Hence logged variables are the
theoretically appropriate measures when used in linear
regression. 12
Second, the regressions of production cost on development
cost are considerably heteroscedatic, i.e., residuals are larger
when cost is higher. This violates an assumption of regression
that error variance is constant over all observations, resulting
in residuals that are not of minimum variance. A common solution
to this problem is to log the variables (see Neter and Wasserman,
12For background on learning curve theory see Kaplan [1982,
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1974). Hence logged variables are methodologically more
appropriate.
Results in Table 9 show that Model 2 is clearly superior to
Model 1 with respect to significance and explanatory power
(adjusted R2 of .78) . Production cost is strongly associated
with the scale of the development program, measured ex post.
Further more, when development scale is "properly" measured ex
post, production cost is also seen to be significantly dependent
on the production run. Longer runs reduce per unit cost.
Comparing the results of the two models, the implicit
inference from the poor explanatory ability of Ex Ante
Development Cost is. that variances incurred in the development
phase of a program are "permanent" in that they contain
information beyond that reflected in Ex Ante Development Cost
relevant to explaining subsequent production costs. Stated as a
hypothesis:
H6 : Production Cost, unexplained = f (+Dev. Time Variance,
by ex ante development cost +Dev. Cost Control Variance)
We test this explicitly by additionally including the two
development cost variances in Model 1 and re-running the
regression. Results (Model 3, Table 9) show both the time
variance and cost control variance incurred during development to
be strongly associated with subsequent production cost.
21
Production Cost and Technological Complexity
Recall that Ex Ante Development Cost is a direct linear
combination of two technology variables (ADVANCE and STAND) and
that Ex Ante Development Cost had little ability to explain
production cost. This might suggest that technology is
unimportant in explaining production cost. Such a conclusion may
be premature.
We know that development costs (ex post) are a good
predictor of production costs; that the scale effect holds. But
the degree to which development costs are associated with
production costs may depend on the technological complexity of
the system produced.
The outcome of a development project is the creation of the
first unit or prototype of a particular system. The cost of that
prototype system will include both "pure" development cost
associated with extending technology and, additionally, the
manufacturing costs (materials, labor, overhead) associated with
construction. The pure development costs are non-recurring. The
construction costs recur with the production of each additional
unit after the prototype. 13 Let's construct a ratio, labeled the
"development premium" ratio, to relate prototype costs
(numerator) with the costs of additional units (denominator)
.
13 In fact that is how development and production costs are
defined in this study, in terms of non-recurring and recurring
costs.
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Development Cost + Production Cost
Development Premium Ratio =
Production Cost
Note this is just a way of relating development and production
costs while controlling for scale.
Assume for a moment a "development" program that requires
"zero" extension of technology or is of "zero" technological
difficulty. In essence "pure" development cost should be zero
and the cost of the prototype should equal the cost of producing
any follow-on unit. The development premium ratio should equal
1; there should be no "premium" to extend technology by zero
amount. Alternatively assume a development project with "great"
technological complexity. The pure development costs should be
large and should not recur for follow-on units; thus the
development cost "premium" should be large (and the ratio greater
than 1) . If the size of the development cost premium is driven
by the technological complexity of the task then the ratio should
be predictable using a measure of the technological complexity of
the system being developed and produced. REACH is a measure of
the total technological complexity of the systems. Operationally
our hypothesis is:
H7 : Development Premium = f (+ REACH)
Table 10 shows results of regressing the premium ratio on REACH.
(Production Run is again included as a control. Production Run
should have a positive sign in this regression since longer
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denominator proportionately more than the numerator, and thus
increasing the ratio.) The coefficient for REACH is positive as
expected and approaches traditional levels of significance. The
implication is that the overall technological complexity of a
system is useful in explaining the degree to which development
cost may exceed production cost. 14 The adjusted R2 of this
regression is not as large as that found in Model 2, Table 9, but
use of the ratio has already controlled for scale, so this
regression explains only the additional variance not explainable
by scale.
Production Cost Variance
The regression model in Table 10 provides an equation for
estimating production costs which includes three variables
(Actual Development Cost, Production Run, REACH)
.
Dev. Cost + Prod. Cost
= a + b± REACH + b2 Prod. Run
Prod. Cost
The equation captures a) the scale of the development phase
(through the Development Cost measure) , b) the effect of learning
on production cost (through the Production Run measure) and
c) the development cost premium idea (through REACH) . REACH is
known prior to development. Development Cost is known after
14 We ran a regression using STAND and ADVANCE in place of
REACH. The coefficient for STAND was significant (p = .094)
while that for ADVANCE was not. The adjusted R2 of the
regression was slightly lower (.50), suggesting that REACH alone
is our best technology measure for capturing the relationship
between development and production cost.
24
development but prior to production. The actual production run
is known only following production, but is a variable a cost
analyst can set prior to production in order to estimate unit
costs at an anticipated production level.
By plugging in (known) values for the three variables and
solving for production cost, we arrive at a predicted production
cost. Subtracting from actual production cost provides a measure
of production cost variance (positive values are unfavorable)
.
While we do not have the ability to break the variance down into
causes, the model does provide a benchmark for assessing if
production cost is out of line, given the knowledge gained during
the development phase.
Figure 4 plots the production cost variance as a percentage
of the production cost. While some of the variances are; not
"small", overall they are considerably smaller than the
development cost variances displayed previously in Figure 3.
This is not surprising. Knowledge about costs gained from the
development phase should allow for better estimation of costs
during production. 15
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This study has examined relationships between extensions in
technology and both development cost and production cost
associated with achieving extensions. The result has been to
15Average (absolute) variance in Figure 4 is 27%. Model 2,
Table 9 also provides a good prediction of production cost.
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develop cost estimating approaches and models that are workable
for both cost prediction and cost control.
Our first step was to identify technology determining
characteristics. Technical expertise was necessary to develop
relevant characteristics. Such characteristics should be goals
of the development process, alterable by engineering development
decisions, and ascertainable at an early stage in the development
process. Factor analysis was used to reduce the number of
technology characteristics to a number manageable during
subsequent analysis.
Through a regression model, the factor scores were used to
predict the year in which systems become operational. High
explanatory ability of this model provided indirect confirmation
that the factor scores appropriately reflected relevant
dimensions of technology.
This regression was used to define a year-of-technology for
individual systems, from which measures of the state of
technology (STAND) , the extension in technology beyond the
current state of the art (ADVANCE) and the extent of technology
embodied in each system (REACH) were developed.
The purpose of creating these technology measures was to
facilitate prediction of the cost of developing new technological
systems, and to offer a methodology for controlling such costs.
It was therefore necessary to hypothesize and test for
associations between the technical complexity of the development
task and the level of activity required to complete the task.
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Two variables, STAND and ADVANCE, reflecting technological
complexity, were successfully used to predict development time.
Development time was found to be positively related to both the
state of technology at the time a development project was
undertaken, and the extension in technology required.
Predicted and residual development time were used to predict
development cost. Results indicated that development cost is not
a smooth function of time; when completion drags on beyond the
"natural" project time, cost increases more rapidly, consistent
with time pressure influencing costs.
This two stage approach to estimating development cost was
found to be superior to a direct production of cost from the
technology variables, indicating that development time is an
intervening variable between technological complexity and cost.
The two stage approach also permitted the creation of
variance measures useful for controlling costs. The Variance Due
to Time reflected the portion of the Total Cost Variance
attributable to the cost consequences of time delays. The Cost
Control Variance indicated the quality of cost control for
projects.
Measures resulting from the analysis of the development
phase were then used to predict production cost. Production
costs were found to be related to the scope of the program, best
captured by the actual ex post development cost. This result
indicated that both the time and cost control variances during
the development phase contain information useful in explaining
27
subsequent production costs; i.e. cost "overruns" experienced
during development tend to be permanent and reflected in higher
production cost.
Lastly, the idea of a development "premium" was introduced
to explain the ratio of development cost to production cost.
Findings indicated that the greater the technological complexity
of the system, the larger development costs are relative to
production costs. This relationship was then used to determine
expected production cost, a benchmark from which a production
cost variance, useful in control of production cost, could be
calculated.
The fundamentals developed in this study provide a workable
methodology for measuring technological complexity and advances
in technology in systems. The methods have also been shown to be
effective in relating technology measures to the cost of
development and production programs. The approach results in
variance measures useful in the difficult task of cost control.
The approach was tested on only one set of data. However,
measures developed at each stage of the analysis were used in
subsequent stages, and at each stage hypotheses about the
expected relationships between variables were confirmed. This
provides some evidence of the internal consistency and logic of
the approach. Of course future research applying similar methods
to additional data sets would be beneficial.
28
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Appendix I
VARIABLES DESCRIBING SATELLITE TECHNOLOGY
Attitude Control System (ACS) variables:
ACS1 — Pointing accuracy (reciprocal) .
ACS2 — Primary stabilization Method (coded: Spin = 0;
moment, inertial, dual = 1)
.
ACS3 — Maneuverability (coded: no = 0, yes = 1)
.
Apogee Kick Motor (AKM) variables:
AKM1 — Specific impulse.
AKM2 — Propellent weight / Dry weight.
Communications variable:
COMM — Power required.
Electrical power systems variables:
EPS1 — Battery Capacity.
EPS2 — Beginning of life power / Array Area.
EPS3 — Array Topology (coded: body = 0, fixed = 1,
movable = 2)
.
Mission or environmental variables:
LIFE — Design life.
NHARD — Degree of nuclear hardening.
LAUNCH — Launch method (coded: missile = 0, Shuttle,
dual = 1)
.
QUALS — Percent of components that must be of "space"
quality instead of merely "aircraft" quality.
APOGEE — A function of maximum orbital distance from earth,
design life and quality.
DESIGN — Design life adjusted for quality.
Thermal variable:
THERM — Tolerable temperature range (maximum - minimum)
.
Tracking telemetry control variable:
TTC — Autonomous operating days.
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Appendix II
This appendix describes the factor analysis process used to
compress the 17 raw technology measures 1 ** down to four factor
scores. The procedure used was part heuristic, part statistical.
Principle components factor analysis with varimax orthogonal
rotation was conducted on the original 17 variables. Variables
with large (>.50) negative factor loadings on the first factor
analysis run were eliminated since characteristics had to be
consistently specified so that increasing values corresponded to
greater technical difficulty. 17 This eliminated DESIGN, ACS3
and EPS2 . QUALS was also discarded because it had no substantial
positive factor loading (no loading greater than or equal to
.50). 18 The remaining 13 variables were factored again and
clustered onto four factors with 78.5% of the variance explained.
At this point the objective in eliminating variables became
to maximize the percentage of variance explained. 19 In addition
to substantial loadings on their principal factors, ACS1, TTC and
LAUNCH had significant loadings in other columns. Through trying
16Data was available for all 17 variables for each satellite
with the exception of variable THERM for satellite R. The mean
value of THERM was used for satellite R in the subsequent analysis.
17See Dodson and Graver [1969] for a further discussion of
this constraint.
18For an excellent summary of variable selection criteria
and "simple" matrix structure objectives see Kerlinger [1973, pp.
672-73]
.
19This is a common practical expedient in factor analysis.
See Harman [ 1976, p. 185].
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various combinations it was found that by eliminating ACS1 and
TTC but retaining LAUNCH the variance explained reached a maximum
of 81.7%. (Of course, this is not an optimization method. In
general, no optimization methods exist for factor analysis.
There is no guarantee that a superior solution could not be
reached by some other sequence of steps. The authors can only
report the steps taken in this particular analysis.) Factor
loadings and eigenvalues from the final rotated factor matrix are
shown in Table 11.
Factor Interpretation
The clustering of the variables and the strong loadings lead
quite easily to conclusions as to the nature of the four factors
that describe the technology embedded in a satellite.
Factor 1 can be labeled MISSION . To achieve a particular
mission, design requirements must be specified reflecting the
distance from earth (APOGEE) , design life (LIFE) and launch mode
(LAUNCH) . While the variable COMM is actually required power for
communications equipment, it should follow from mission
specifications
.
Factor 2 consists of two apogee kick motor variables. Since
the apogee kick motor is used to achieve a particular orbit, we
have labeled this factor ORBITAL .
Factor 3 consists of three variables reflecting ELECTRICAL
POWER technology. Battery capacity (EPS1) and array topology
(EPS3) are directly related to the technical sophistication of





FACTOR 1 FACTOR 2 FACTOR 3 FACTOR 4
APOGEE .9632 .0337 -.0891 .1204
LIFE .9599 .0328 .0015 .0456
COMM .8391 .1331 .3663 .0616
LAUNCH .7376 .0485 .4279 .4189
AKM2 .0869 .9802 -.0465 .0820
AKM1 .0370 .9611 -.2015 .0516
ACS 2 .1668 -.0800 .8055 -.3237
EPS 3 .3438 .0127 .7822 .2536
EPS1 -.1284 -.2747 .5379 .0722
THERM .1635 -.0866 -.1575 .8464
NHARD .0917 .2131 .1706 .7602
EIGENVALUE 4.006 2.348 1.388 1.250
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is indirectly associated with electrical power because the
stabilization method has implications for array deployment which
depends on array topology type.
Factor 4 consists of two variables reflecting the
ENVIRONMENT in which the mission is to be conducted. The
temperature range (THERM) affects component design, while the




Agency No. of copies
Defense Technical Information Center 2
Cameron Station
Alexandria, VA 22 314
Dudley Knox Library, Code 0142 2
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 9394 3
Office of Research Administration 1
Code 012
Naval Postgraduate School
Monterey, CA 9 394 3
Library, Center for Naval Analyses 1
4401 Ford Avenue
Alexandria, VA 22302-0268




Mr. Michael C. Hammes 4
NAVSEA 017
Department of the Navy
Naval Sea Systems Command
Washington, DC 2 03 62
Professor 0. Douglas Moses 20
Code 54 Mo
Department of Administrative Science
Naval Postgraduate School




3 2768 00327559 5
